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PROFESSOR Wasserstrom's little book represents the initial efforts of a young
lawyer-philosopher, just embarking upon a career of teaching in law, to bring
the insights and enlightenment of a sister discipline to bear upon problems in
the judicial decision process. Such efforts at using philosophy to improve law
deserve applause, even if they do not achieve perfect success. The study is con-
cerned with the problem of how courts ought to decide cases,1 and Professor
Wasserstrom has presented his remedial prescriptions forthrightly and with
vigor. The question which his inquiry is an attempt to answer is whether logic
ought to have a significant function in the process of judicial decision making.2
This focus has led the author to consider the nature and persuasiveness of at-
tacks upon "the deductive theory" of judicial decision making and to evaluate
other methods of making decisions which have been evoked by supposed rejec-
tions of "logical" decision procedures. 3 This reviewer cannot help but wonder
whether the whole enterprise might not have been radically altered if a slightly
different question had been asked and investigated carefully-namely: whether
the formal deduction that is in fact involved in judicial decision making is really
important in providing criteria for choice or whether it is in this respect a mat-
ter so trivial as to be of almost inconsequential importance in a full contextual
analysis of judicial decision making.
Nearly half of the book is devoted to a discussion of the role of precedent
and equity in judicial decision making that might, perhaps, be of interest to a
beginning student of law. More stimulating and more controversial is the dis-
cussion in the remaining chapters about the possibility of a deductive procedure
by judges for deciding legal disputes, the relation of two kinds of utilitarianism
(extreme and restricted) to possible judicial decision procedures, and Professor
Wasserstrom's own recommended procedure as to how judges ought to decide
cases. In conclusion he urges that courts use a two-level procedure of justifi-
cation; this is indicated to be the same as asserting that a rational decision
process is both possible and desirable.4 Membership in an old and firmly estab-
lished philosophical tradition--"the tradition that proclaims the rewards of






reasoned inquiry and the virtues of enlightened action"-is claimed for such
conclusions.5
The recommended two-level procedure of justification is grounded in the
moral philosophy of restricted utilitarianism that emphasizes the evaluation of
a particular action by appeal to a moral rule, which in turn is to be justified in
terms of a principle of utility for producing maximum happiness with minimum
conflict.0 The mode of judicial decision making rejected by Professor Wasser-
strom is one that is supposed to be a parallel of extreme utilitarianism in which
a particular decision is justifiable if and only if "the particular consequences of
an act are justifiable on utilitarian grounds."'7 The crux of Professor Wasser-
strom's position is his emphasis upon logic and rules in judicial decision mak-
ing. The two crucial features of his two-level procedure of justification which
are claimed to make it a "rational" decision procedure are:
1. [B]efore any particular decision is deemed to have been truly justi-
fied, it must be shown to be formally deducible from some legal rule. Here
the ordinary canons of logic would be employed to determine whether the
conclusion reached indeed follows from the premises selected.8
2. [B]efore any particular decision is deemed to have been truly justi-
fied, the rule upon which its justification depends must be shown to be it-
self desirable, and its introduction into the legal system itself defensible.9
One cannot help but wonder to what extent such a focus upon logic and
rules as the crucial features of the judicial decision process tends to blur the
important insight of the legal realists that these are only relatively minor parts
of how judicial decisions are in fact (and should be) made. In the two-level
procedure of justification the author emphasizes the role of "ordinary canons
of logic" and rules, and thereby tends to underplay in a full contextual analysis
of judicial decision making the intimate personal responsibility of the judge in
the judicial act of decision and the discretion that is involved in such other
aspects as (1) determining (primarily at the trial court level) which of various
events claimed to have occurred are to be treated as having occurred for pur-
poses of adjudicating the dispute, (2) characterizing the events found to have
occurred in the dispute in terms of the normative language of the "legal rules,"
(3) selecting which among various proposed rules are the appropriate ones to
be applied to the particular dispute before the court, and (4) interpreting the
selected rule or rules to decide whether the characterized events of the dispute
fulfill the conditions required to be fulfilled for imposition of the legal conse-
quences of the rules. The danger of such preoccupation with logic and rules is
that it may encourage the tendency of a careless decision maker who relies
upon an inappropriate rule to ignore the over-all effects of his decision. A more
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where discretion and flexibility are available and not presume that every de-
cision-maker automatically incorporates such awareness into his rule-justifica-
tion procedure. One of the examples offered by Profess6r Wasserstrom in sup-
port of the two-level procedure of justification dramatically illustrates this
danger.
Suppose that someone has given me his gun to keep and I have promised
to return it to him should he ask me for it. And suppose that after having
talked several times about committing suicide, he comes to me in a par-
ticularly despondent mood and demands that I keep my promise by re-
turning the gun to him immediately. It is argued that as an extreme
utilitarian I might be justified in breaking my promise in this case on the
grounds that the consequences of breaking my promise would in the long
run be less deleterious than those which would result from honoring the
promise and permitting an almost certain suicide. But as a restricted
utilitarian, I would, arguably, be justified only in keeping my promise and
returning the gun, because I had promised to do so and because the rule
"Always keep your promises" is a rule which is clearly justifiable on utili-
tarian grounds.10
Professor Wasserstrom explains that a careful restricted utilitarian probably
would not return the gun because he would probably decide that the rule "Al-
ways keep your promises" is not as justifiable on utilitarian grounds as the
rule "Always keep your promises except when keeping the promise would result
very probably in the immediate loss of a human life."" If this is the case, let's
hope that there are not too many careless restricted utilitarians among the
judiciary! An approach to judicial decision making based upon a philosophical
theory that demands some meticulous care in order to make the appropriate
decision in such a hypothetical example as the one above seems unlikely to
attract much favor among law men (and women). Judges are faced with more
agonizing choices upon which to expend their not-limitless reservoirs of me-
ticulous care.
Neither of the criteria in the two-level procedure of justification exclude
judicial discretion; they merely fail to pinpoint where that discretion is exer-
cised-which may, in turn, encourage less-than-comprehensive evaluations of
a particular judicial decision.
Those inclined to sympathize with the outlook of the legal realists may feel
that it is a rather distorted version of legal realism that is presented in The
Judicial Decision as the alternative to the two-level procedure of justification.
To believe that logic and rules should and do have relatively minor roles in
judicial decision making and that the effect of the decision upon the particular
parties involved in the litigation should be and is generally regarded as one
important aspect is quite different from believing that judges should decide
cases on the basis of their intuition alone without any recourse at all to logic





of the judge without any consideration being given to the over-all effects of his
decision.12 The latter is a bit remindful of a slightly overstuffed straw man.
As an inquiry into the relation between logic and judicial decision making,
The Judicial Decision has left a great deal unsaid about logic. To a reader
unfamiliar with the revolution that has occurred in modem logic during the
past century in adopting mathematical techniques and vastly extending its scope,
there is no hint that advances have been made since the time of Aristotle.
Nowadays, it is a bit misleading to talk about showing particular decisions to
be deducible from legal rules merely by means of "the ordinary canons of
logic."1 3 Since there are now a multitude of logical systems from which to
choose, it is helpful for the sake of clarity to specify just which system is being
referred to. For example, in the customary two-valued propositional logic, the
following conclusion:
(3) Lawyers do not reason intuitively.
is formally deducible from the following pair of premises:
(1) Either lawyers use mathematical logic or lawyers reason intuitively.
and
(2) Lawyers do not use mathematical logic; and it is not so that if law-
yers use mathematical logic, then lawyers reason intuitively.
There are a great many lawyers who reason intuitively-and some more rigor-
ous logicians, too 14 -who might question the appropriateness of using custom-
ary two-valued propositional logic as the test of the formal deducibility of (3)
from (1) and (2). One wonders what system Professor Wasserstrom has in
mind for testing formal deducibility.
In order to refrain from injecting further confusion into a literature that is
already sufficiently muddied, contemporary writers about logic and law ought
to be extremely careful in specifying exactly what they refer to when they use
the word "logic" and to exercise some restraint in their claims about how logic
may be useful to lawyers. 15 Most of the occurrences of the word "logic" in legal
12. See Ch. 7.
13. P. 172.
14. See, e.g., ANDERSON, COmPLETENESS THEOREmS FOR THE SYSTE.MS E OF ENTAIL-
MENT AND EQ OF ENTAILMENT WITH QUANTIFICATION (Technical Report No. 6, Office
of Naval Research, Group Psychology Branch, Contract SAR/Nonr-609(16), New Haven
(1960)) ; Anderson & Belnap, Jr., The Pure Calculus of Entailment (Forthcoming in J.
OF SYMBOLIC LoaIc); and BELnAP, JR., A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF ENTAIL ENT (Technical
Report No. 7, Office of Naval Research, Group Psychology Branch, Contract No. SAR/
Nonr-609(16), New Haven (1960)).
15. For a perceptive account of the relation of logic to decision making in law along
with a rather comprehensive summary of the literature on logic and law, see Simitis, The
Problem of Legal Logic, 3 RATIO 60 (Eng. Trans. 1960). It is also curious to find missing
from the bibliography in THE JUDICIAL DECISION any reference to the works of Felix S.
Cohen, one of the most astute and sensitive commentators of all on the relation of logic
and law. See, e.g., Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 809 (1935) ; and Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950).
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writings seem to refer to a loose synonym for "common sense" or else the
writer's opinion about what is reasonable. It is somewhat startling, as well as
paradoxical, that among the members of a profession that is held out to the
public as expert in the art of communication, there is so little reference to or
apparent awareness of modern logic as a tool of analysis that can help improve
communication by enhancing the precision of language. This reviewer has else-
where expressed views about how modem logic can be used to advantage by
lawyers in drafting and interpreting legal documents, in making the informa-
tion retrieval aspect of legal research more effective, and in helping to make
normative language more systematic and precise, and urged the usefulness of
exposing lawyers to some training in modern logic. 6 But how to develop what
Reichenbach calls "common sense enough to learn more than common sense
[itself] can teach," continues to be an interesting problemY1 However, it does
not contribute to the cause of clarifying how lawyers can benefit from some
knowledge of modern logic to hint vaguely that logic can somehow provide
criteria for making value choices. Most lawyers know better. In a truly con-
troversial situation, where the important decision is a choice between compet-
ing values, an emphasis upon logical deduction as a criterion for choosing is
frequently little more than dust for the eyes of the unwary.
In any legal system faced with the task of reaching some practical accom-
modation between the competing goals of predictability and flexibility, is it
realistic to hope for objective criteria to evaluate whether or not a given judicial
decision has been adequately justified? Or is the best to which one should
reasonably aspire merely a procedure that encourages the persons autiorized
by the community to adjudicate disputes to consider as much of the relevant
information as is practical in their efforts to implement the goals and policies
of the community and to exercise their own personal subjective sense of rea-
sonableness and fairness in reaching a decision? Can a judge ever hope in a
genuinely controversial situation to make a decision that cannot be shown by
some criteria to be "wrong" in some respect-a decision with which some other
observer cannot have some reasonable disagreement?
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